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The declining share of beef in total U.S. meat consumption has motivated industry-
wide efforts to improve average beef quality through more effective coordination
among the various market participants. Increased use of explicit grid pricing mech-
anisms over the last decade represents initial efforts at improved coordination.
More recent efforts include animal-specific carcass data collection, with subsequent
transmission to feeders and the relevant cow/calf operations, and improved source
verification procedures aimed at (among other things) reducing the overall cost of
medical treatment for live animals. None of these organizational innovations is
costless, and indeed a number of significant barriers must be overcome before
more widespread adoption of such practices takes place. This paper takes a detailed
look at one organization’s attempts to overcome some of these barriers, and pro-
vides a qualitative assessment of this and other potential organizational responses.
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U.S. beef demand has increased since 1998, due in large part to a change in con-
sumers’ preference for red meat (Purcell, 2000). However, beef consumption has
declined steadily over the last two decades, both in aggregate quantity and as a share
of total U.S. meat consumption. Reductions in the price of pork and poultry relative
to beef, and health concerns regarding the consumption of red meat in the 1980s and
early 1990s, account for a large portion of this trend. Relative improvements in the
quality and consistency of pork and poultry products are also cited as important
contributing factors (Purcell, 2000; Schroeder, Marsh, and Mintert, 2000; Piggot and
Marsh, 2004). Perhaps not coincidentally, beef has lagged behind pork and poultry
in adopting mechanisms for vertical coordination among the various production
stages from farm to market. Contract arrangements and direct vertical linkages are
common in pork and poultry production, while beef production is still predominantly
coordinated through market mechanisms (Hayenga et al., 2000).
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1  This presumes, of course, that in fact consumers are willing to pay for improved quality, and that producers can
respond if given the right information. For evidence on demand for quality or specific traits, see, for example, Lusk
et al. (1999) or Umberger et al. (2001). In the next section we document how producers can and do respond to better
information.
Whether vertical coordination of the kind observed in pork and poultry markets
is necessary for further improvement in beef quality is a question that beef industry
participants are currently trying to sort out. A variety of novel marketing practices
have been adopted in recent years in an apparent attempt to improve quality and
reduce overall production costs. At one extreme, there have been (recent) attempts
to fully coordinate the beef production process with a single firm orchestrating
genetic selection, feeding practices, slaughter and fabrication, and marketing. During
2004 and 2005, Smithfield, the world’s largest pork producer and processor,
increased vertical integration in the beef sector (Cattle Buyers Weekly, 2005). Long-
term marketing arrangements between feedlots and packers represent a somewhat
less extreme form of coordination, and have been used in some production areas for
many years. Interestingly, the mostly widely adopted change in recent years—so-
called grid pricing—represents an attempt to improve market coordination through
more sophisticated quality-based pricing mechanisms. In this case, and in contrast
with direct vertical coordination, there are essentially no formal vertical linkages,
though there is an attempt to improve vertical coordination by sending more precise
signals concerning the relative value of alternative carcass attributes.
1
Behind all these efforts is at least one common objective: to align incentives
among the various specialized segments involved in beef production so that quality
improvement is in everyone’s self-interest. As explained in further detail in the next
section, many of the traditional mechanisms for marketing live cattle (both feeder
and finished cattle) are seemingly not designed with this objective in mind. In
particular, there are significant restrictions on the flow of production-relevant infor-
mation across the various stages of beef production. For example, feedlot operators
are typically not provided detailed information on the genetic characteristics and
health status of animals arriving at their feedlots, even when efficient feeding strate-
gies may be contingent on each of these pieces of information. Similarly, ranchers
normally receive, at most, lot-average information on the carcass characteristics of
cattle they produce, making it impossible to evaluate the performance of individual
breeder cows for improved genetic selection. Of course, removing these sorts of
restrictions is not costless. Information has to be collected and transmitted, and
perhaps most importantly, incentive structures (i.e., marketing arrangements) must
be developed that provide the relevant parties appropriate incentives for doing so.
One can only expect organizational change of this nature to occur if the associated
benefits are sufficiently large relative to the costs.
To get some feel for the potential magnitude of these benefits and costs, we take
a detailed look at one organization’s (the Chariton Valley Beef Alliance) attempt to
overcome restrictions on information flows among cow/calf operations, feedlots, and
packers. This particular organization operates as a market intermediary by facili-
tating coordination within existing market mechanisms, and thus achieves a degreeHueth and Lawrence Information Transmission in Cattle Markets   95
2  Often the finishing stage is preceded by a “backgrounding” stage that serves as preparation for finishing.
3  An individual producer might simultaneously ranch, feed, and develop seedstock; some packers own feedlots
that supply their plants; and so on.
of vertical coordination without formal vertical linkages. As noted earlier, this is in
contrast to other types of coordinating institutions (e.g., fully integrated organi-
zations, and other forms of formal vertical linkages). Our case study and analysis are
unique in their focus on information transmission across firms and individual
producers, as opposed to contract design and internal firm management.
In what follows, we begin with a brief overview of cattle production and market-
ing, and provide more detail on the informational barriers that exist in these markets.
The activities of the Chariton Valley Beef Alliance (CVBA) are then examined in
the context of these markets. Next, we analyze the relative merits of organizations
like CVBA that operate largely within the structure of existing cattle markets,
relative to other forms of vertical coordination involving significant consolidation
of asset ownership and decision-making authority among cattle market participants.
The final section concludes by examining beef industry challenges in the context of
broader economic questions and in light of the proposed National Animal Identi-
fication System.
Cattle Markets and Information Transmission
Our intent in this section is not to provide a comprehensive description of cattle
markets, but rather to focus on a particular set of issues having to do with the
transmission of production-relevant information across the various stages of
production. In particular, we examine existing barriers to the flow of production-
relevant information from cow/calf operators (or ranchers) to feeders, and in reverse
from packers to feeders and ranchers.
The production process for beef cattle is typically characterized in terms of a
number of discrete stages starting with genetic selection and breeding, then rearing
and weaning, and finally feeding to market weight (finishing) and slaughter.
2
Specialization in cattle markets largely mirrors each of these stages: seedstock firms
control genetic selection and breed development, ranchers manage cow/calf herds
and raise young calves through the weaning stage, feeders raise animals from
weaning to market weight, and packers slaughter and process live animals. Although
there are many variations on this specialization structure,
3 for the moment our focus
is directed to this particular arrangement.
One can, in principle, characterize efficient decision making at each production
stage, subject to a given set of growing conditions, breed type, feed costs, and other
market parameters, and subject to many other pieces of production-relevant
information. For instance, a feeder’s nutrition and health maintenance program for
a given animal (or lot of animals) might conceivably depend on nutrition and
treatment histories during the rearing and weaning production stages, thus creating
the need for information transmission from ranchers to feeders. Evidence of latent96   Spring 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
4  Most of this variation is accounted for by discounts for nonconforming cattle (Trenkle, 2000; Ward and Lee,
1999).
demand for this kind of information comes from a recent survey of feedlot managers,
where respondents indicated they typically receive little information about incoming
feeder cattle vaccination schedules, implant or nutritional histories, and even less
about genetics and feedlot and carcass performance (Behrends, Field, and Conway,
2001). This is the case even though the vast majority of respondents also indicated
a willingness to pay a premium for cattle with accurate information on these criteria.
More recently, Busby et al. (2004) quantified a significant reduction in feedlot
performance and carcass quality of animals that were treated twice for sickness com-
pared to those that did not require treatment.
Transmission of production-relevant information from ranchers to feeders is
important for real-time decision making in feedlots, while information about manage-
ment procedures and production outcomes during feeding and finishing is important
for future decision making and efficient adaptation by ranchers. Thus, it may also
be important to transmit information in the reverse direction, from feeders and
packers to ranchers. For example, ranchers need information on feeders’ manage-
ment procedures, finishing performance (e.g., average daily gain, feed efficiency,
health status), and post-slaughter carcass quality in order to evaluate past decision
making. That such information can indeed improve decision making is documented
in Hall, Parrish, and Busby (1993) where multi-year participants in steer test
programs who received feedlot performance and carcass data were able to achieve
a greater degree of uniformity, as evidenced by smaller standard deviations for
nearly all quality and yield relevant carcass attributes. Forristall, May, and Lawrence
(2002) identify important economic tradeoffs among many of these variables, and
Strohbehn (1999) shows that carcass values for producers selling on a grid can vary
by as much as $350 per head within a load.
4 Thus, information that allows producers
to more carefully manage and sort cattle can be of considerable value.
While information transmission of these sorts might seem like an obvious
requirement for efficient decision making in beef production systems, in fact it rarely
occurs. Tracking, recording, and transmitting information is costly; precisely how
costly depends in large part on how coordination is achieved. To illustrate, imagine
that each production segment is represented by a single firm and these firms do
business only with each other. Information transmission in such a setting is relatively
straightforward, so long as the parties can control various kinds of strategic behavior
that might arise. For example, depending on how prices are determined for feeder
calves, ranchers may want to falsely report information about their calves in order
to increase their value in the eyes of the feeder. Unless all relevant information about
the calves can be obtained from visual inspection (in which case information
transmission occurs trivially), some procedure is needed for verifying information
reports. In the relatively simple organizational structure contemplated here, where
in particular the parties are engaged in a repeated relationship, it is perhaps natural
to suppose that these kinds of strategic problems can be overcome with dynamicHueth and Lawrence Information Transmission in Cattle Markets   97
5  For example, some ranchers and feeders may choose to specialize in the production of commodity beef, yet still
wish to use traditional marketing channels.
6  Interestingly, there are also USDA established grades for feeder cattle, though they are rarely used explicitly in
actual pricing mechanisms between ranchers and feeders. Twelve distinct grades classify calves into various
combinations of frame size (skeletal structure in relation to age) and thickness (development of the muscular system
in relation to the skeletal system) (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2000). Importantly, these grade attributes all
pertain to physical characteristics of animals—there is no assessment of health status, prior feeding regimes, or any
other unobserved attributes that may be important to feedlot operators.
incentives, and without incurring the cost of third-party information verification.
This might be the case when a feedlot obtains cattle from the same ranch or ranches
with whom long-standing relationships exist.
Now imagine a slightly more complicated organizational arrangement with a
single feeder firm, a single packing firm, and a large anonymous group of ranchers
who supply weaned calves to the feeder. Because the ranchers are anonymous, the
parties can no longer rely on dynamic incentives, and must depend instead on some
form of costly third-party verification. We can complicate this scenario further still
by supposing that there are two or more feeders who compete for the supply of
feeder calves at any given point in time. Then, in addition to third-party information
verification (which in practice does not exist in this setting), some mechanism (e.g.,
auction) is needed to allocate available calf supplies efficiently. Although it is not
immediately apparent how the need for such a mechanism further complicates infor-
mation transmission, it is important to recognize that once established, its proprietors
may have an economic interest in restricting information transmission. Such is
apparently the case for some livestock auctions. There is anecdotal evidence that
traditional auction barns fear detailed information transmission and communication
between feeders and ranchers (i.e., the removal of anonymity), because this might
lead to private contracting and elimination of the intermediate auction market. Trans-
acting parties may conduct their business outside the auction to avoid associated
marketing and commission charges. Finally, one more layer of complication can be
added: in actual markets between ranchers and feeders, it is typically the case that
only some ranchers and feeders wish to engage in more intensive information
transmission.
5 If the cost of setting up a separate market for these feeder cattle is
excessively high, then the existing market must simultaneously handle both types
of animals. As will be seen below, this induces significant transaction costs.
If the previously described costs are sufficiently high, the transacting parties may
choose either to forego information transmission entirely or to seek some substitute
information that is perhaps not quite as detailed but is less costly to obtain. In the
context of markets for feeder calves, order buyers possibly fill this role. These are
specialized individuals (and sometimes firms) whose expertise lies in evaluating
feeder calves through visual inspection, and aggregating cattle into larger, more
homogeneous groups. Many feedlots employ order buyers to supply calves with
traits that are appropriate given the expected environmental conditions, end-product
markets, and management practices of the particular feeding operation.
6 However,
any such visual inspection, no matter how experienced the buyer, is an imperfect98   Spring 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
7  Some information is implicitly transmitted when buyers visually inspect animals for purchase and arrive at a bid
price. Indeed, Schroeder, Marsh, and Mintert (2000) note how packing plants often provided order buyers with grid
sheets indicating price premiums and discounts to award (or penalize) various expected (based on the buyer’s visual
inspection) quality outcomes. Nevertheless, the information conveyed through a buyer’s bid aggregates information
about individual carcass attributes that may be valuable in disaggregate form.
8  A “lot” of cattle in a typical feeding operation represents roughly 150S200 head.
9  This is an unavoidable consequence of uncertainty that is inherent in the biological production process for cattle.
Because animals mature at uneven rates, a feeder may need to pool cattle across heterogeneous feeding and health
maintenance regimes when preparing a lot for delivery to the packer.
substitute for transmission of all production-relevant information. Specifically,
vaccination, nutrition, and treatments histories cannot be observed. Feedlots
conservatively assume the worst case, often expecting the need to readminister
treatments, and therefore reduce bid offers.
A similar set of arguments and discussion can be applied to information transmis-
sion in the reverse direction from packers to feeders and ranchers. As noted above,
information about carcass traits is important to firms upstream from packers in order
to assess the impact of decisions on performance, and to update decision-making
rules. Traditionally, cattle markets have functioned without explicit transmission of
carcass attributes to upstream producers.
7 Recently, however, grid pricing—where
the price paid for a given animal depends on various measured quality attributes, in
addition to the total weight of the animal—has become increasingly common.
Relative to traditional spot markets where price is based on live or carcass weight
with no explicit adjustment for quality, significantly more information is reported
back to ranchers and feeders. However, the information reported back is generally
not animal specific, and even if it is, it often is reported only to feeders (and not
ranchers who make genetic decisions). We explain below why this is so, but for now
we note only that in most grid pricing mechanisms, packers report the distribution
of carcass quality for a given lot of animals,
8 rather than the carcass quality of each
individual animal. Thus, for example, a feeder might learn that 60% of a given lot
graded Choice and 40% graded Select, while 70% Yield Grade 2, and 30% Yield
Grade 3, but not know how individual animals within the lot graded. This is impor-
tant because management decisions often vary across different animals that are
priced in the same lot,
9 and feeders may want to know the carcass traits of individual
animals in order to assess the efficacy of their management decisions.
In the next section, we describe the activities of one organization that is
attempting to overcome these kinds of informational barriers in an effort to improve
farm-level decision making. In the subsequent section, the generic coordination
issues faced by the organization are identified, and the extent to which the organi-
zation has succeeded in its endeavors is discussed. Our intent is to use the activities
of this organization as a case study of organizational innovation in agricultural
markets. We also hope to shed some light on the important organization-theoretic
question of why markets generally seem to be poor mechanisms for transmitting
nonprice information across individual producing agents.Hueth and Lawrence Information Transmission in Cattle Markets   99
10  Interestingly, none of the activities discussed below, possibly with the exception of source verification, neces-
sarily requires a grower alliance to be carried out. However, each activity involves a substantial fixed cost, and thus
may not be economically viable without sufficient scale. The CVBA and other similar alliances represent one way of
achieving the necessary scale without formal consolidation and integration across farm operations.
The Chariton Valley Beef Alliance
The CVBA, which represents a core group of about 30 cattle producers in southern
Iowa and northern Missouri, has been in place since early 1998. Initial motivation
for the alliance arose from an increasing use of grid pricing arrangements by area
packers, and resulting producer interest in learning to effectively produce, sort, and
market cattle under these arrangements. There was also general interest among area
producers in “adding value” to their cattle by improving quality and identifying
higher paying markets. The organization’s primary activities directly address the
informational barriers discussed in the previous section.
10
The CVBA legally is structured as a 501C nonprofit organization, governed by
an elected board of directors. Active CVBA members are self-described as larger
and more progressive than typical midwest cow/calf producers, with most ranging
in size from 80 to 350 beef cows. Many producers feed their own calves to slaughter
weight and may buy other cattle to feed in their small feedlots. Because they feed
their own cattle, members are better able to utilize carcass data and market infor-
mation services to improve genetic selection and overall management. However,
their small size also makes it difficult to justify the cost of providing these services
by themselves.
CVBA provides three kinds of services to member producers: (a) grid marketing
support and coordination of load deliveries, (b) carcass data collection, and (c) source
verification. Each of these services is discussed in detail below.
Grid Marketing Support and Load Coordination
Grid pricing greatly increases the incentive to sort cattle into relatively uniform lots
that will perform well on particular grids. A typical grid offers a base price for
Choice Yield Grade 3, and then premiums and discounts for quality outcomes above
and below this base. However, the specific premiums and discounts offered can vary
substantially across different grids.
Of course, it is impossible to know the exact distribution of quality within a given
lot at the time a feeder markets his or her cattle. Relative to traditional spot markets,
where buyers pay a fixed price for live animals, feeders thus bear substantial quality
risk. However, this risk also entails a benefit which is the added incentive feeders
have to produce high quality animals, and to carefully sort for a given distribution
of quality. To the extent that producers and feeders are able to influence the quality
of their cattle, and match heterogeneous cattle with the appropriate grid, these
incentives can yield substantial benefit. Sellers and Bodensteiner (2001) summarize
year 2000 performance for CVBA participants on roughly 4,000 cattle marketed into100   Spring 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
11  For example, suppose there are just two producers, each with a single load of animals, and the relevant grid
offers a price w = w ˆ – b + pq, where w ˆ is the Nebraska weighted average price for the relevant week, b is the cleanup,
and p is the per unit quality premium for quality q. If one producer delivers animals with quality q1, and the other
delivers animals with quality q2, then the cleanup for that week is calculated as b = p(q1 + q2)/2. Thus, the cleanup
is calculated as the average premium (discount, if negative) across all animals delivered in a given week, and this
amount is subtracted from the Nebraska weighted average price to yield the actual base price.
four different grids. On a per lot basis, premiums averaged $26.05 per head with a
range of –$40.44 to +$79.01 per head.
The small-scale producer members of CVBA market relatively few cattle each
year and do not have a basis for comparison to judge their cattle visually or with
carcass data, nor do they stay abreast of grid program changes throughout the year.
The CVBA assists growers in acquiring the skills to manage and sort for quality, and
provides information to evaluate competing grids. This is primarily accomplished
with analysis of growers’ carcass data. CVBA also provides weekly grid-market
reports, comparing base-price bids across grids, which include publicly available
price information, and base price information collected from each packer indi-
vidually. Grids commonly used in the Midwest are formula grids that pay growers
a base price which is a function of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Nebraska
weighted average price, and the distribution of quality for each individual plant
where a grid is offered. The specific functional relationship is composed of the
USDA weighted average price report, plus a packer-specific adjustment (or cleanup)
to ensure the average price paid for cattle in any given week (including premiums
and discounts) is equivalent to the Nebraska weighted average price.
11 Such an
adjustment effectively ensures that each packer pays roughly the same average cost
for cattle.
Finally, given the size of most farmer feeder operations, it is often the case that
a producer will have a number of cattle ready for sale on a given grid, but insuffi-
cient quantity to fill an entire truck. In such cases, CVBA also provides support for
growers to coordinate in jointly filling a truckload for delivery to a particular packer.
This service can result in substantial transportation efficiencies for long-distance
hauls, allowing growers to sort more precisely and access grids at more distant
packers.
Carcass Data Collection
As mentioned in the previous section, grid marketing involves the pricing of indi-
vidual animals (rather than lots of animals) based on the measurement of various
carcass-quality attributes, yet animal-specific carcass measurements are rarely
transmitted back to the feeders and cow/calf producers who deliver under these
arrangements. The CVBA facilitates and coordinates this transmission. Producers
interested in obtaining individual carcass data pay a service fee to CVBA ($3S$8 per
head), which then coordinates with a third party to physically carry out carcass
measurement during slaughter; these measurements are then recorded in electronic
form for access by the relevant producer. Packers cooperate in this process byHueth and Lawrence Information Transmission in Cattle Markets   101
12  The difficulty in obtaining the data lies in the nature of the cattle slaughter and packing process. When an animal
enters the plant and is slaughtered, it is immediately hung on a rail tracking system and assigned a plant identification
code. However, rail outs of some animals disrupt the matching of plant IDs with growers’ IDs at the point of grading.
The task of the third party is to manually track animals through to the grading point using the growers’ IDs, and to
physically measure economically important carcass traits.
13  Other users of these data include feeders, breeders interested in the performance of progeny, pharmaceutical
companies, university researchers, and others who want to measure carcass performance for research purposes.
14  Notably, increasing concern about food safety (and more recently, country of origin labeling) has resulted in
efforts to establish systems for traceability—i.e., the tracking of firm identifications, and slaughter and packing dates
associated with individual animals. In principle, there is no reason why other pieces of information, such as medical
treatments, growth and carcass performance, etc., could not be added to each animal’s record. However there is still
the need to coordinate on the format and content of this additional information. Recent experience with efforts of the
National Cattlemen’s Beef Association to establish a voluntary standard for data recording suggests this is not a trivial
matter (Smith, 2002).
allowing third-party access to the slaughter floor to measure economically important
carcass traits (beyond those reported in USDA yield and quality grades). CVBA
additionally provides computational and analytic support for accessing and inter-
preting the relevant data. This analysis allows growers to make better marketing,
nutrition, and genetic decisions.
While it might seem a trivial matter to distribute animal-specific carcass quality
data to producers (given that prices are determined with these data), in fact, it is
quite a complicated and costly endeavor.
12 As indicated above, doing so adds any-
where between $3 and $8 per head to the cost of production; Iowa State University
Extension estimates a gross margin of roughly $15 per head for Iowa feedlots, so
these amounts are large. In any case, ranchers are the primary potential users of
animal-specific carcass data,
13 but are one step removed from packers. This further
complicates collection of the data, because feeders must cooperate in obtaining the
relevant data.
Source Verification
Assessing quality in markets for feeder cattle is a notoriously difficult task. As dis-
cussed above, quality assessment is largely carried out through visual inspection by
experienced buyers. Many of the important quality characteristics of feeder calves
are of course not fully expressed until the calves have been finished. Nevertheless,
the bulk of cattle are sold by ranchers to feedlots through traditional market mech-
anisms (e.g., auctions and spot negotiations), and quality assessment at the point of
sale is a highly subjective process.
One means of making this process more objective is to provide third-party veri-
fication of genetic and health characteristics of feeder cattle. While the ultimate
quality of the finished animal is impossible to assess at the point of sale between
rancher and feeder, it is possible to evaluate quality potential through this type
of information.
14 Moreover, if we define quality broadly to include potential cost
efficiencies from acquisition of production-relevant information (as described
earlier), then such information can be of further value. Anecdotal evidence suggests102   Spring 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
significant amounts of excess treatment occur in feedlots as a prophylactic response
to uncertainty about animal health status. CVBA assists in arranging third-party
verification through its source verification program. In addition to providing an
objective measure of quality, source verification provides feedlots with accurate
information on the status of medical treatments that have occurred prior to the point
of sale, and the genetic composition of animals in a given lot. Finally, CVBA’s
source verification program includes agreements by those receiving information on
feeder cattle to return information on carcass quality. CVBA thereby assures that
information flows in both directions.
Analysis and Lessons Learned
Barriers to Information Transmission and Incentives 
for Vertical Coordination
The activities of CVBA described above highlight the difficulty in transmitting
information across firm boundaries and in processing information for use in actual
decision making. At least three generic types of problems limit the free flow (and
subsequent use) of information among the various stages of beef production:
P Information Asymmetry. There are opportunities for strategic misreporting of
information arising from information asymmetries and differences in objectives
of the contracting parties. A single rancher who sells feeder calves to a finish-
ing lot may wish to overstate the health status of his or her animals in an
attempt to bargain for a relatively high price. To the extent that health status
is difficult to observe from visual inspection, full (and accurate) information
transmission may require some form of documentation (e.g., treatments and
test outcomes) and verification.
P Imperfect Commitment. In any coordination setting where there are opportuni-
ties for Pareto gain, realization of these opportunities requires full commitment
from the relevant parties. In practice, full commitment is difficult to achieve
because it is costly to contract on all relevant outcomes.
P Bounded Rationality. Individual producers (e.g., ranchers or feedlot operators)
may lack the capacity to process information for use in actual decision making.
Data analysis is a specialized skill, and information processing is costly.
As noted in our introduction, some authors have suggested that explicit vertical
coordination is necessary for further improvement in cattle quality. This conjecture
is consistent with the fact that organizational theorists often cite the generic
problems enumerated above as principal motivations for vertical coordination (e.g.,
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). However, there are many different ways in which
vertical coordination can occur, so it is not entirely clear what specific kind of verti-
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15  In a repeated relationship, the transacting parties can rely on reputation as an enforcement device, thus elimi-
nating the need for third-party involvement (e.g., Schotter, 1984; Bull, 1987).
Vertical coordination may be defined in terms of the set of contractual require-
ments placed on sellers (e.g., the suggested use of specific inputs or management
practices; product specifications), or possibly by the ownership of physical assets
across multiples stages of production (i.e., vertical integration). The key feature of
a vertically coordinated system that seems important in the context of cattle markets
is the establishment of a long-term (potentially exclusive) relationship among the
relevant transacting parties. Standard transaction cost arguments (e.g., Williamson,
1985) suggest a group of ranchers and a feedlot who commit to a long-term relation-
ship (via an arms-length contract, or by becoming a single firm) can have confidence
that any investment undertaken to establish an information tracking system will not
be wasted. Similarly, committing all future deliveries to a single packer can ensure
that any investments undertaken by the packer to solve the logistical problems
associated with reporting (animal-specific) information on cattle quality will be fully
rewarded. With a long-term relationship, the transacting parties may also avoid the
need for third-party information verification,
15 and can save on information pro-
cessing costs by establishing a “culture” for coordinating the accumulation of firm-
specific knowledge (Crémer, 1993; Kreps, 1990).
While clearly beneficial in some respects, long-term commitments of this sort also
entail costs. In particular, the parties to such an agreement limit their use of markets,
which offer greater flexibility in procurement and sourcing options, enhanced price
discovery, and arguably higher powered incentives toward cost-reducing activities.
“Firms” inevitably involve elements of bureaucracy that can lead to inefficient
resource allocation decisions, and possibly higher overall production costs. Activi-
ties by organizations such as CVBA can thus be viewed as attempts to achieve the
degree of coordination and information transmission observed in firms, but without
sacrificing the benefits associated with market institutions.
Chariton Valley Beef Alliance: Lessons Learned
So far, we have described the activities of the CVBA and some of the generic
coordination problems these activities appear to address. Has the organization
succeeded? And if not, where has it failed? What lessons can be learned from these
successes and failures? In this section, these questions are addressed in relation to
each of the generic issues raised above.
Overall, the organization has had great success in helping producers collect and
process information. The core group of 30 growers continues to collect carcass data
with the help of the CVBA, and to request assistance in evaluating grid marketing
options. However, attempts to expand beyond this group have not been successful.
Over the eight years during which the CVBA has been active, it has provided
services to at least 350 distinct growers, but many have failed to remain active.
According to Joe Sellers, the founder and lead organizer of the CVBA, many104   Spring 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
producers “just lock themselves in [to one packer] and don’t want to spend the time
evaluating grids on a weekly, monthly, or even yearly basis.” This comment reflects
the real cost that must be incurred to process information. Careful monitoring of
carcass data and of grid options simply may not pay for growers who have a high
opportunity cost for their time.
CVBA’s attempts to develop a source-verified program for its members were
largely unsuccessful. Two reasons are cited for this failure. First, it was difficult to
get all producers to accept full third-party verification. Again, according to Joe
Sellers, “For the producers who have 300S600 cows it’s really hard for them to do
that with an external veterinarian because they can’t work all the cattle in a day. It’s
really hard to get 4S5 days scheduled with our veterinarians and get that done, and
some of those producers have other things besides cattle to take care of.” Second,
the CVBA opted to run its source verification program within the existing market
infrastructure for feeder cattle, but was never able to generate full cooperation
among the organizers of this infrastructure. States Sellers, “... we wanted to work
with the sale barns; we didn’t want them upset with us, so we were trying to work
with them, ... but the two big ones we really needed weren’t really willing to do it.
They would say, ‘it’s your deal, it’s your deal,’ and they wouldn’t help promote it
and explain it to people.”
In summary, the CVBA has been quite successful in dealing with “bounded ration-
ality” and information processing costs. Through the organization, producers have
effectively spread the fixed cost of a full-time employee to assist in collecting and
analyzing carcass data. It seems plausible that in a fully integrated cattle operation,
one or more employees would be assigned a similar task. In this sense, the CVBA
has been able to achieve some of the benefits of vertical integration via horizontal
coordination.
However, the organization has mostly failed in attempts to overcome information
asymmetries—and this failure is partially the result of imperfect commitment.
Attempts to overcome (one form of) information asymmetry by source-verifying the
health and breed status of feeder calves with a third party have failed in part because
of the sheer cost of third-party verification. Moreover, strategic concerns among
existing market participants have also played a role, partly reflecting the inability to
costlessly enforce long-term contracts. Assuming there are efficiency gains from
source verification (enough additional surplus is generated to make all parties better
off), perfect contracting would allow, for example, the Chariton Valley Beef
Alliance to commit to sharing some of this surplus with existing market participants,
or perhaps just to a promise of continued patronage, even if source verification
eventually led to some form of “private treaty” between the CVBA and one or more
large feeders.
Whether or not the CVBA and other similar organizations will grow and over-
come these problems is an empirical question that will be answered with time. In the
interim, attempts to further characterize the relative costs and benefits of alternative
organizational structures represent an important area for further research. For
example, the discussion in this paper (and in much of the theoretical literature onHueth and Lawrence Information Transmission in Cattle Markets   105
16  See Holmstrom (1999) for a discussion of complementarities between firms and markets where imperfect per-
formance measurement is the key contractual friction. For recent surveys of empirical work on organizational design,
see MacLeod (1995) and Prendergast (1999). Hueth and Hennessy (2002) survey recent empirical work in agricultural
markets with a focus on risk.
organizational design) views firms and markets as substitute organizational structures.
In cattle markets, there appear to be instances of important complementarities where
market prices are used within firms and among participants in vertically coordinated
arrangements as a reference point in establishing terms of trade.
16
Conclusions
In this paper we identify a number of seemingly obvious shortcomings in the way
cattle production is organized, and discuss one organizational response to these short-
comings. Traditional cattle markets, while extremely efficient means of allocating
cattle supplies across buyers, lack mechanisms for animal-specific information
transmission. Given the segmentation observed in cattle production, information
transmission is important for efficient decision making at each of the various produc-
tion stages. The lack of information transmission represents a coordination failure.
Specifically, all parties involved apparently understand the potential gains from
improving communication, but lack appropriate incentives to do so. In some cases,
various kinds of transaction costs must be incurred to bring about change.
The activities of the Chariton Valley Beef Alliance represent one response to this
coordination failure. The alliance has attempted to aid growers with (a) grid market-
ing and coordinating load deliveries among multiple producers, (b) collecting and
analyzing carcass data, and (c) “source-verifying” producers’ animals. Our case
study indicates that the alliance has had modest success with the first and second of
these activities, but has mostly failed in its attempt to develop a source-verified
feeder cattle program. This failure can be attributed in part to the transaction cost
associated with engaging a third party to conduct the verification, but also to a lack
of cooperation among organizers of markets for feeder cattle. This latter factor may
partially reflect the perception that source-verified systems represent a move toward
tighter coordination, and eventual bypass of existing market organizers.
If an alliance of producers such as the one considered here is unable to achieve
greater coordination within existing market institutions, some form of direct vertical
coordination may emerge instead. The recent (and failed) initiative by the organizers
of Future Beef Operations to form a ranch-to-market production organization repre-
sents one example of movement in this direction (The Economist, 2003). Recently
proposed legislation to ban or limit the extent of contracting and vertical coordin-
ation in cattle markets (e.g., Schuff, 2002) clearly provides support for efforts to
achieve coordination within markets, though possibly at the cost of biasing organi-
zational evolution, and slowing the development of improved coordination systems.
Finally, the proposed National Animal Identification System will provide an
electronic infrastructure for tracking animals in the case of a foreign animal disease.106   Spring 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
The current USDA proposal will require that animals be identified and that their
origin be traceable. This mandated infrastructure will lower the cost of transferring
other economically important animal information, possibly leading to greater infor-
mation transmission of the kind discussed here.
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